



File No:U-15-6030;  
W2010-02073-CCA-R3-CD;  
Hearing Date: December 02, 2015

IN THE UNIVERSAL SUPREME COURT  
OF THE T'SILHQOT'IN

Between:

Michael Wayne Parsons

Appellant

And:

State of Tennessee

Appellee

**REASONS FOR JUDGMENT**

[1] This is a final appeal proceeding relating to the wrongful conviction and travesty of justice in case 6030 and subsequent proceedings brought before me, this 2<sup>nd</sup> day of December 2015 for correction from the Circuit Court of Tennessee at Covington Twenty-fifth Judicial District regarding Mr. Michael Wayne Parsons. As, the duly appointed Chief Justice of the Universal Supreme Court of the T'silhqot'in, an international aboriginal court under the authority of the host T'silhqot'in Nation's *Constitution of the T'silhqot'in Nation*, now dispose of this here international matter which the guest nation, the United States of America and the Twenty-fifth Judicial District of the State of Tennessee is obliged to uphold under the full faith and credit doctrine as well as the Host/Guest Nation concept. Pursuant to sections 3(17) of the *Constitution of the T'silhqot'in Nation* "All rulings by the Universal Supreme Court of the T'silhqot'in are final and without appeal and must be upheld by guest nations and international courts and governments;"

[2] On December 02, 2015 the appellant, Mr. Parsons, of aboriginal descent, attorned to the Universal Supreme Court for relief, pursuant to section 3(16) of the *Constitution of the Tsilhqot'in Nation* and section 2 & 3 of the *Universal Supreme Court Act*. It is unknown if service was duly rendered upon the appellee, therefore the State of Tennessee has 30 days after service to apply by written submissions to this court, and only this court, to change or vary this ex parte order/ judgement, pursuant to section 3(17) of the *Constitution of the Tsilhqot'in Nation* and has 45 days to appear before me at the Kamloops USCT Division, British Columbia, to show cause why these findings should not be fixed. I note that nothing in these reasons preclude Mr. Parsons from proceeding with his civil claim either in this court or another venue.

HELD: Mr. Michael Wayne Parsons is hereby exonerated of all prior 2007 convictions; 2 counts of aggravated assault, 2 counts of theft, and burglary of a vehicle are hereby nullified.

#### HISTORY OF THE CASE:

[3] On September 24, 2007 a neighbour Mr. Barry D. Laxton across the street from 444 Hughes Road in a rural Tennessee community of Brighton, USA, where Mr. & Mrs. Parsons resided, was according to Mr. Laxton's own testimony mowing his lawn when he spotted some of Mr. Parson's dogs (which happened to be a wolf/dog cross, hereafter referred to as "dogs", "dog" or in particular "Brandi"; simply for brevity and dispelling of any myth that a wolf/dog cross is of any other temperament other than the ordinary range of dog breeds) running loose.

[4] There was evidence presented to the court by both parties that Mr. Parsons was a responsible dog owner who kept his dogs in an enclosed, fenced space unless on a leash or otherwise controlled but on this day as at times animals and children sometimes do, some of the dogs escaped or intentionally were, and unknown to the Parsons, let loose from their enclosure and were at large.

[5] I note here that it is highly suspect that the incident which occurred that day just so happened to coincide with a meeting that Mr. Parsons had with his attorney regarding a civil suit against the State of Tennessee with respect to election fraud. I also note it was improper during the underlying proceedings for the General Sessions Judge William Peeler and a Circuit Court Judge, Joseph H. Walker III to have anything to do with this case against Mr. Parsons due to the conflict of interest with respect to the civil suit in which they were named as parties. Instead of recusing themselves from the proceedings as other judges properly had done, they purposefully interjected

themselves into this case and continued to be seized of this case, giving not only the semblance of impropriety but outright conspiracy , collusion and corruption against Mr. Parsons, above Mr. Parsons repeated objections.

THE ALLEGED CRIME:

[6] So on September 24, 2007, while Mr. Laxton, claimed he was mowing his daughter's lawn across the street from the Parsons property to the south. Another neighbour, Mr. King, on the property adjacent to Mr. Parsons's property on the north side of the street, doing mechanical work near a hangar on his father in law's property. Mr. King testified that he saw Mr. Laxton attempting to "shushing away" Mr. Parsons dogs who were at large, on their own property, across the street. Mr. King also testified all the dogs left the vicinity except for one dog named Brandi. Mr. King and Mr. Laxton testified Mr. Laxton went into his daughter's house, retrieved a rifle and went back outside. It has never been explained why Mr. Laxton had his rifle in his daughter's house. Mr. Laxton did not call the Parsons or animal control. Any reasonable person would have called the Parsons, animal control or the police.

[7] Mr. King testified that he incited or egged Mr. Laxton on, becoming an accomplice to the actions of Mr. Laxton by saying, "When the wolf then crossed the ditch, I said, 'You better do something now. He's coming at you.'" By his own testimony he refused or neglected to stop, hinder, or dissuade Mr. Laxton from going across the street with his rifle. Mr. King later told Mr. Laxton to hide his rifle in his (King's) truck.

[8] It was at the point Mr. Laxton stepped off of daughter's property and crossed the street with a semi-automatic rifle in hand that Mr. Laxton ceases to be a victim and becomes the predator, hunter, stalker and perpetrator of the crime that ensues. If Mr. Laxton would have gone inside his daughter's house, instead of going back outside with his rifle, for his protection, in case the dog crossed the road to attack him, he might have had an arguable defence for shooting the dog in self-defense . Instead, Mr. Laxton crossed the street, off his daughter's property, putting himself in close proximity to the dog which he claimed was endangering him. He then fired his semi-automatic weapon towards the north into the Parsons property, fatally killing the dog, attacking Mr. and Mrs. Parsons who were outside looking for their dog. Whether Mr. Laxton shot in the air at first or not, whether the lay of the land had any depressions or ditches in it does not matter because at some point his spray of bullets flew low

enough to hit the dog on the ground, simultaneously endangering the life of Mr. and Mrs. Parsons. Mr. Parsons testified that he heard several bullets fly past him while witnessing Mr. Laxton shooting in his and his wife's direction, eventually killing his dog Brandi, who was in close proximity to both Mr. and Mrs. Parsons. It is here that proof of malice aforethought with willful intention to commit murder of Mr. & Mrs. Parsons exists, that *mens rea* is met. It is plain and obvious if one bullet had been shot into the Parsons property with intent, a crime had been committed. There is ample evidence a barrage of bullets were shot into the Parson residence.

[9] Any reasonable person would question Mr. Laxton's motives for going back outside with a rifle if he felt unsafe outside with Mr. Parson's dogs at large. Mr. Laxton not only went back outside on his daughter's property, but then took steps off his daughter's property, toward the dog across the street, coming into closer proximity to the dog, spraying Mr. Parson's property with bullets, endangering the life of the Parsons. It is to be noted neither Mr. Laxton nor Mr. King reside in the neighbourhood where Mr. Parsons live but were on September 24, 2007 visiting relatives and both happened to be outside doing yard work. In other words, neither were on their own property. This event coincidentally was only the 3<sup>rd</sup> time the Parsons's dogs were ever at large. At trial the issue or possibility of foul play was never raised but attempted murder can be proven.

[10] During the trial, both Mr. Laxton and Mr. King both provided oral and written testimony. Both men testified that they were only shooting at the dog Brandi and not at Mr. & Mrs. Parsons and in effect could not see them therefore were not targeting them. Yet both make admissions of hearing, which can also be heard on tape, that Mr. Parsons yells at them to "Stop shooting", placing Mr. Parsons in Mr. Laxton's line of fire. Whether they had seen Mr. Parsons or not is irrelevant, they **heard** Mr. Parsons and continued shooting. Mr. Parsons would not have to say, "Stop shooting!" if the shooting had ceased before he arrived. Mr. Parsons testified he even fired his gun in order to get Mr. Laxton's attention to stop shooting in his presence. It was only at this time Mr. Laxton stopped shooting and walked over to Mr. King's vehicle instead of taking his gun to the house of his relatives. Mr. Laxton hid the evidence of his crime. It is the subsequent actions of Mr. Laxton and Mr. King that determine the degree of the crime in my view. Any reasonable person who discovered that they nearly shot another person by accident would have displayed some sort of shock or horror. None of that exists in this case. Had Mr. Laxton and Mr. King

been apologetic when they discovered Mr. & Mrs. Parsons were in their line of fire after the fact or shown some sort of remorse or regret for what could have resulted in the death of the Parsons, it could have been argued that Mr. Laxton had only committed aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. But that is not what occurs. What happens is that Mr. King tells Mr. Laxton to hide the weapon, then Mr. King retrieves his own gun from his truck, claiming the act of picking up his gun was self defense. The question remains as to why the actions of Mr. King were found by the court to be justified as self-defense while the actions of Mr. Parsons were not. Mr. Parsons cannot be guilty of any crime. There was not a word of remorse by either Mr. Laxton or Mr. King for the actions that could have resulted in murder of the Parsons and did result in the death of their dog. Throughout the proceedings, their lack of remorse tends to demonstrate intent to commit bodily harm if not murder, and Mr. King's intent to assist him.

[11] Now I turn my attention to Mr. Parsons. Simply put, a man who cries, "Stop shooting!" is using words of self-defense not aggression. It is clearly evident Mr. and Mrs. Parsons were in Mr. Laxton's line of fire, which renders all subsequent actions of Mr. Parsons to be that of self-defense. Under the law of self-defense even if Mr. Parsons could have returned fire and shot Mr. Laxton, [which he mercifully does not do, I might add, and both Mr. Laxton and Mr. King should be very grateful to Mr. Parsons for that] Mr. Parsons could not be guilty of a crime as he was acting in self-defense in response to a shooter shooting at him, his wife and his dog. [See paragraph 25 herein, Necessity Defense.] Further, Mr. Parsons confiscated Mr. Laxton's rifle as evidence and nothing more, which was prudent to do in this case as the evidence may have disappeared or could have been used by the perpetrator to further his crime. It has been noted Mr. King told Mr. Laxton to hide Mr. Laxton's rifle. Seizing a weapon from a perpetrator at a crime scene can not be deemed as "theft" under any circumstances. Also, Mr. King's actions of reaching for his cell phone instead of his pistol speaks of no imminent danger imposed upon him by Mr. Parsons therefore it was Mr. Parsons who was at all times material the true victim. Fundamentally speaking, due to the fact Mr. Laxton fired the first shot at Mr. and Mrs. Parsons, it should have been clear to law enforcement, judges, the Grand Jury, the trial jury and all those involved with this case Mr. Parsons was acting in self-defense. The fact Mr. Parsons was charged with false and malicious charges which can not in any way be misconstrued or judgment

wrested from actions of self-defense speaks of judicial misconduct, apprehension of bias, discrimination, perjury, fraud, conspiracy and collusion.

[12] Mr. Parsons had every right under law to protect himself by diffusing the danger and threat to himself, his wife, his pets and belongings caused by Mr. Laxton and Mr. King. Mr. Parsons is in the truest sense a hero and an example of courage and bravery, yet as the victim in this case, he was without cause made to suffer, without limiting the scope of his suffering; calumny, false accusation, slander, libel, false arrest, false prosecution, false conviction and false imprisonment, denial of due process, loss of income, loss of business, loss of dog, mental anguish, hardship, assault, pain and cruelty. I am satisfied that the actions Mr. Parsons took on September 24, 2007 was legally correct and in my view worthy of commendation and his suffering worthy of compensation.

[13] Out of an abundance of evidence and proofs of Mr. Parsons's innocence that were brought out in this case, particulars of which I will not reiterate except for Mr. Parsons's dog being found upon examination by the veterinarian and examiner to have no head or frontal bullet fragments or holes only bullet damage to the back which attests to fact that the claim with respect to the dog charging the state's witness, Mr. Laxton is a lie.

#### THE TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE:

[14] Mr. Parsons as a matter of federal and international law had an undeniable right to counsel. Quoting from the trial transcript at lines 18-10, pp. 2&3 Mr. Parson states that:

...I object to this Court taking me to trial today without counsel. Let the record reflect that I do not waive my right to counsel. 'We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel as guaranteed in the 6<sup>th</sup> Amendment. This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecutions including prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The denial of assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail sentence. Under the rules we announce today every judge will know when the trial is a misdemeanor start that no imprisonment may be imposed even though local law permits it unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the sentences and gravity of the offenses and therefore, know when to name the lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts. And this is *Argersinger v Hamlin*, 407U.S. 25<sup>th</sup>, 27<sup>th</sup>, 31<sup>st</sup>, 37<sup>th</sup>, 38<sup>th</sup>, 40<sup>th</sup>, of June 12, 1972. Your Honour, I do not waive my right to counsel as guaranteed by the 6<sup>th</sup> Amendment again.

Judge Walker erred in law by not providing Mr. Parsons an attorney after Mr. Parsons advised the court the previous court appointed attorney withdrew twice, two weeks before the trial date. In response Judge Walker abused his powers by compelling Ms. Mills to sit side chair or as "elbow counsel" to Mr. Parsons during the trial as

well as compelling Mr. Parsons to conduct his own trial. The travesty of justice that occurred at trial included the following elements:

- a) Mr. Parsons a pro se litigant had to prepare an entire trial by himself in less than 2 weeks.
- b) Mr. Parsons was unable to give instruction to counsel because counsel would not speak to him.
- c) Mr. Parsons “elbow counsel” did not utter a word during the trial in Mr. Parsons’s defense.
- d) Mr. Parsons was suing Ms. Mills, so Ms. Mills was in conflict of interest with respect to Mr. Parsons best interests.
- e) In consequence, Mr. Parsons conviction must be nullified because Mr. Parsons neither had counsel nor had waived the right to counsel.
- f) The trial court engaged in substantive judicial error by allowing the trial to proceed without effective counsel.
- g) It was unconscionable for the Tennessee Court of Appeal to not reverse Mr. Parsons’s conviction based on the denial of due process rights to counsel in a matter where incarceration is at issue; this is a flagrant violation of USCA, AM 14 &6.

[15] In addition to the previously stated travesty of justice, both Judge Walker and Peeler were named in the civil suit regarding election fraud by Mr. Parsons. They did not recuse themselves. Quoting again from the trial transcript lines 25,1, pp. 14,15 Mr. Parson and Judge Walker state:

...And of course, now that there is a civil lawsuit against the judge, I would ask the judge to recuse yourself. I make that motion now. Court: That request will be denied.

And again at trial transcript lines 11-18, p. 13 it reads:

And then we had the probable cause hearing in April, for which I asked Judge Peeler to recuse himself, citing the fact that he, individually, ordered my arrest the date of the event via phone conversation with the officers, according to eye witnesses who will testify to that effect and of course, myself, who was told that by officers at the scene.”

These judicial indiscretions and improprieties are suspect. On the day of the shooting, Judge Peeler ordered Mr. Parsons’s arrest; creating a conflict of interest by subsequently ruling against Parsons at the probable cause hearing, suggesting a set up and conspiracy by these two judges against Mr. Parsons; which is illegal and a criminal offense, violating the laws of Tennessee and the US Constitution, rendering all their rulings against Mr. Parsons void on their face. Judges Peeler and Walker engaged in judicial misconduct by not recusing themselves

due to a conflict of interest. Judges Walker and Peeler erred by seizing themselves with matters relating to Mr. Parsons, abusing their authority over Mr. Parsons and control of this case.

[16] Mr. Parsons was repeatedly denied due process and his rights during this case which consequently resulted in a miscarriage and travesty of justice. The majority of Mr. Parsons objections were denied when they ought not to have been. For example, Mr. Parsons had rightful claim to the witnesses he chose found at trial transcript lines 24-1 pp. 15,16 stating:

Your Honour, I do not waive my right to compulsory process to subpoena a key witness, Dr. Tina Fisher, whose testimony is crucial to my case.

This right was wrongfully denied by the court along with several other times Mr. Parsons was denied his evidence.

[17] Deputies, sheriffs private investigators and other law enforcement personnel at the scene of the crime were negligent and/or failed to take statements from either Mr. or Mrs. Parsons, and refused to investigate all the evidence at the crime scene.

[18] At some point during the trial it was discovered that during the voir dire, jurors lied about their relationship to the state's witnesses and officials, denying Mr. Parsons of an impartial jury; it was this same partial jury which wrongfully convicted Mr. Parsons.

[19] I accept the 15 page Chronology of Mr. Parsons's in the form of a letter with a Nexus attached to it, as being an accurate depiction of the denials of due process, violations, atrocities, cover ups and travesties of justice suffered by him and his family and I therefore attach it hereto.

[20] There is ample evidence suggesting a collective motive to silence Mr. Parsons during the trial; a travesty of justice done to frame, wrongfully convict and wrongfully imprison Mr. Parsons.

ERROR IN LAW:

[21] The Rule Book of all rule books states at Proverbs 17:15, "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord," and at Zephaniah 3:3, "...her judges are

evening wolves; they gnaw not the bones till the morrow.” This herein case is a prime example of a gross miscarriage and travesty of justice which must be corrected and Mr. Parsons fully exonerated. The said judges, district attorney and government employees involved with Mr. Parsons’s had a vested interest in silencing Mr. Parsons and preventing him from his civil claim against them which they eventually succeeded obtaining.

[22] The 6<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the *US Constitution* states:

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

In *Gideon v Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 355 (1963) rules that indigent defendants must be provided with counsel in **all** felony cases, especially where incarceration is an issue as stated before in the American seminal case of *Argersinger v Hamlin*. This 6<sup>th</sup> Amendment was violated during these proceedings by failure to provide Mr. Parsons with effective counsel, by failure to order witnesses and allow evidence in his favor, and failure to provide Mr. Parsons with an impartial jury therefore all 2007 convictions of Mr. Parsons are rendered a nullity and set aside.

[23] The 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the *US Constitution* states:

Amendment XIV, Section 1.

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Mr. Parsons was deprived of his liberty and property, without due process of law or equal protection of Law.

[24] Under the *Constitution of Tennessee*, Mr. Parsons was denied his rights as the victim in this case, whereat section 35 states:

“Section 35.

To preserve and protect the rights of victims of crime to justice and due process, victims shall be entitled to the following basic rights:

(a) The right to confer with the prosecution.

- (b) The right to be free from intimidation, harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice system.
- (c) The right to be present at all proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present.
- (d) The right to be heard, when relevant, at all critical stages of the criminal justice process as defined by the General Assembly.
- (e) The right to be informed of all proceedings, and of the release, transfer or escape of the accused or convicted person.
- (f) The right to a speedy trial or disposition and a prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction or sentence.
- (g) The right to restitution from the offender.
- (h) The right to be informed of each of the rights established for victims.

The General Assembly has the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims by this section”

[25] In my view this is a classic case where the Tennessee laws of the Necessity of Self-Defense applies and is quoted following:

“The Necessity Defense. Under Tennessee law, conduct that would otherwise be criminal is justified if it is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm. Moreover, the need to avoid harm must outweigh the harm to society or the interests of others brought about through the defendant’s act. T.C.A. § 39-11-609.

Self-Defense. The following statute set forth the defense of self-defense under Tennessee law. Note in particular the italicized provision, which represents an important change in the law.

A person is justified in threatening or using force against another person when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. The person must have a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury must be real, or honestly believed to be real at the time, and must be founded upon reasonable grounds. There is no duty to retreat before a person threatens or uses force. [emphasis added]

Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury within the person’s own residence is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury to self, family or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence, and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred.

The threat or use of force against another is not justified if the person consented to the exact force used or attempted by the other individual. The threat or use of force against another is not justified if the person provoked the other individual’s use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless: The person abandons the encounter or clearly communicates to the other the intent to do so; and The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force against the person. (e) The threat or use of force against another is not justified to resist a halt at a roadblock, arrest, search, or stop and frisk that the person knows is being made by a law enforcement officer, unless:

The law enforcement officer uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest, search, stop and frisk, or halt; and The person reasonably believes that the force is immediately necessary to protect against the law enforcement officer’s use or attempted use of greater force than necessary. T.C.A. § 39-11-611.

In *State v. Renner* (1995), the Supreme Court expounded on an important recent change in Tennessee law as it relates to self-defense.

Birch, J. ...

Until recently, Tennessee has traditionally followed the common law “duty to retreat” rule. Under this rule, one is required to retreat, “if reasonably feasible, except in defense of one’s home or habitation or in the discharge of official duty.”

In 1989, the General Assembly added a “no duty to retreat” rule to the law of self-defense. ... With this enactment, Tennessee joined the majority of jurisdictions which adhere to the “true man” doctrine. ... Under the “true man” doctrine, one need not retreat from the threatened attack of another even though one may safely do so. Neither must one pause and consider whether a reasonable person might think it possible to safely flee rather than to attack and disable or kill the assailant.

... As in all cases of self-defense, the force used must be reasonable, considering all of the circumstances. Moreover, the “true man” rule implies no license for the initiation of a confrontation or an unreasonable escalation of a confrontation in progress.

Whether the “true man” rule applies in a particular case is a matter to be determined by the jury. The jury determines not only whether a confrontation has occurred, but also which person was the aggressor. It also decides whether the defendant’s belief in imminent danger was reasonable, whether the force used was reasonable, and whether the defendant was without fault. ...

Related Defenses. In Tennessee, a person is also justified in using force against another person to defend a third person who is in immediate danger. T.C.A. § 39-11-612. One is also justified in using force to prevent a suicide or self-infliction of serious injury. T.C.A. § 39-11-613.

Protection of Property. Tennessee law permits a property owner to use force to prevent or terminate a trespass to land, but deadly force is not permitted. T.C.A. § 39-11-614. This extends to the use of devices, as long as they do not carry a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. T.C.A. § 39-11-616.”

[26] Under the *Constitution of the Tsilhqot’in Nation* section 4-Bill of Rights<sup>1</sup>(a-q) states:

4-Bill of Rights:

- 1) This CONSTITUTION OF THE T’SILHQOT’IN NATION guarantees and extends the following fundamental rights and freedoms and the right to not be deprived thereof, to people who elect to stand under this CONSTITUTION OF THE T’SILHQOT’IN NATION;
  - a) The right to life, liberty, safety and happiness;
  - b) The right to freedom of religion and conscience;
  - c) The right to freedom of thought, belief, opinion, press and speech;
  - d) The right to be treated fairly and equally at all times;
  - e) The right to not be subjected to any abuse, discrimination, cruel or unusual punishment;
  - f) The right to freedom of mobility, association, peaceful assembly;
  - g) The right to vote, call a referendum, peaceful protest and voice grievances;
  - h) The right to pursue a livelihood, own and advance property without oppressing others;
  - i) The right to be free from corrupt, immoral and tyrannical practices, laws and rulings;
  - j) The right to be free from crime and criminals;
  - k) The right to be presumed innocent and treated as such, until proven guilty;

- l) The right to a speedy, just and fair trial;
- m) The right to choose family rehabilitation, family counseling and parental training in lieu of family separation;
- n) The right to personal rehabilitation, edification, alternative medicines, therapies;
- o) The right to be informed of the truth;
- p) The right to freedom from oppression, genocide, poisoned food, air, water, bodily harm;

CONCLUSION:

[27] For all the reasons above, it is hereby ordered that Mr. Michael Wayne Parsons was wrongfully and falsely charged and wrongfully and falsely convicted on counts of aggravated assault, burglary of a vehicle , theft by the State of Tennessee. The wrongful convictions are nullified and set aside and Mr. Parsons is fully exonerated henceforth. I make a *Vancouver (City) v Ward*, 2010 SCC 27 ruling. The State of Tennessee is ordered to pay Mr. Parsons \$5000 per diem accrued for each day Mr. Parsons spent in incarceration with respect to the 2007 conviction.

[28] Mr. Parsons is free to seek further relief and compensation for business loss, aggravated and punitive damages, and libel and slander. The 2007 felony conviction is to be expunged from Mr. Parsons's record. The Appellees are to pay court costs to the Universal Supreme Court in the amount of \$10,000. The 2014 indictment will be dealt with separately.

By the Court:

\_\_\_\_\_  
The Honourable Chief Justice  
of the Universal Supreme Court